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One of the core complexities involved in evaluating decision alternatives in the area of public decision-making is to deal with
conflicts. The stakeholders affected by and involved in the decision often have conflicting preferences regarding the actions under
consideration. For an executive authority, these differences of opinion can be problematic, during both implementation and
communication, even though the decision is rational with respect to an attribute set perceived to represent social welfare. It is
therefore important to involve the stakeholders in the process and to get an understanding of their preferences. Otherwise, the
stakeholder disagreement can lead to costly conflicts. One way of approaching this problem is to provide means for comprehensive,
yet effective stakeholder preference elicitation methods, where the stakeholders can state their preferences with respect to actions
part of the current agenda of a government. In this paper we contribute two supporting methods: (i) an application of the cardinal
ranking (CAR) method for preference elicitation for conflict evaluations and (ii) two conflict indices for measuring stakeholder
conflicts.The application of the CARmethod utilizes a do nothing alternative to differentiate between positive and negative actions.
The elicited preferences can then be used as input to the two conflict indices indicating the level of conflict within a stakeholder
group or between two stakeholder groups. The contributed methods are demonstrated in a real-life example carried out in the
municipality of Upplands Va¨sby, Sweden. We show how a questionnaire can be used to elicit preferences with CAR and how the
indices can be used to semantically describe the level of consensus and conflict regarding a certain attribute. As such, we show how
the methods can provide decision aid in the clarification of controversies.
1. Introduction
One of the core complexities involved in evaluating decision
alternatives in the area of public decision-making is to deal
with conflicts. The stakeholders affected by and involved
in the decision often have conflicting preferences regarding
the actions under consideration. For an executive authority,
these differences of opinion can be problematic during
both implementation and communication, even though the
decision is rational with respect to an attribute set perceived
to represent social welfare; see, e.g., [1–3].
Of particular interest for the decision-making forum
are preferential conflicts between stakeholders, since such
conflicts may cause delays in the decision process due to
obstructions, hassles, and/or locked negotiations [4–6]. For
instance, Hansson et al. [6] describe that the development
plans of Husby, a suburb to Stockholm, had been on hold for
several years due to conflicts. Another example is given in
Danielson et al. [5], where three infrastructure decisions in
Nacka, a municipality in the Stockholm region, were delayed
for several years due to conflicts between stakeholders.
Therefore, to avoid stakeholder conflicts it is important for
the executive authority to involve the stakeholders in the
process and to get an understanding of their preferences
[7, 8].
This calls for a desire to become better informed with
regard to potential controversies, and it has been discussed
in contemporary decision analysis literature that interac-
tion with stakeholders using web-based techniques is one
feasible approach to obtain stakeholder preferences and
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then inform decision-makers by utilizing decision analysis
techniques. For instance, French et al. [1] suggest that web-
based approaches can be used to support and structure the
democratic process. Hansson et al. [6] suggest that a solution
to the above-mentioned problem of conflicts could be to
actively interact with stakeholders early in the process by the
use of social media.
In this approach, an important first step is to elicit
the opinions or attitudes of the citizens regarding a set
of “actions”. These are potential actions that in the future
may be redefined into more well-defined projects. It has
been recognized that the selected methods must be easy
to use for less experienced stakeholders and at the same
time be sufficiently powerful to enable them to provide
meaningful feedback [9]. To facilitate scalable elicitation,
many approaches (including ours) promote the use of web-
based surveys or questionnaires distributed to stakeholders
early in the planning phase [3].
In this paper we contribute with an application of the
cardinal ranking (CAR) method [10], extended with a feature
for conflict evaluations, and a method for measuring conflict
within a stakeholder group and between two stakeholder
groups. The contributions support the decision process in a
public decision-making setting.
Cardinal Ranking for Conflict Evaluations. To the best
of our knowledge, no method exists that utilizes preferences
elicited by a cardinal ranking approach in conflict evalua-
tions. In this application of CAR [10], the respondents, in
addition to cardinally ranking the elements, state the perfor-
mance of the elements relative to a do nothing alternative. For
example, supporting statements are like “action 1 is better than
action 2, and both actions are negative relative the do nothing
alternative and “action 2 is much better than action 3, action 2
is positive whereas Action 3 is negative relative the do nothing
alternative”.
Conflict Indices. In a group decision analysis setting, it
is of interest to investigate whether a certain alternative is
conflict-prone with respect to one or more attributes. The
preferences elicited by the application of CAR can be used for
assessing the level of conflict within or between stakeholder
groups. We describe two such indices, the Within-Group
Conflict Index and the Between-Group Conflict Index, both
utilizing a sum of squares, used in Ward’s clustering method
[11, p. 466] and extended with a positive stakeholder scal-
ing constant. The underlying group formation is similar
to the collective attractiveness and unattractiveness indices
presented by [12]. The approaches differ in how the value
functions are created and utilized. Bana e Costa [12] creates
one value function per criterion by applying MACBETH and
its semantic categories. In our approach the respondents use
CAR to create their individual value functions per criterion.
In turn, this enables individual value estimates of the do
nothing alternative which is not necessarily viewed as a
“neutral” alternative.
With this we contribute to the first important step in
a participatory group decision process by elucidating both
conflict-prone actions and nonconflicting actions. An action
is conflict-prone when there are strong opposing preferences
regarding the performance of the action, either within a
stakeholder group or between two stakeholder groups. An
action is a nonconflicting action when the stakeholders have
similar preferences.
1.1. Case Setting. In this paper, we describe a case conducted
in Upplands Va¨sby municipality slightly north of Stockholm
City. In this case, we analyzed the citizens preferences regard-
ing a set of actions that could be implemented in the future.
A previous reporting of the case can be found in Chapter 7
of Ekenberg et al. [13], in which a simplified conflict measure
was utilized. In the reported method, the stakeholders were
divided into two groups, the con- and the pro-group. The
conflict index was then measured as the difference between
the arithmetic means of the groups part-worth values. The
methods presented in this paper are rather based on Ward’s
method [11].
Typically, the actions are described quite briefly, for
example, in short sentences such as “Build residential area
near the lake” or “Build apartments in the town centre”.
In the paper, we use the term “action” to distinguish from
the more traditional term “alternatives” employed within
the field of decision analysis. In our setting, an action is
a tentative project proposal without an associated cost but
rather a line of direction for a future project.This is somewhat
similar to the tentative proposals defined as “topics” by
[14].
In order to understand attitudes, the questionnaire must
allow for the participating stakeholders to state positive
or negative preferences regarding an action’s performance
relative to a do nothing action. In order to measure con-
flict, the statements need to be represented in a manner
allowing for such a measure to be meaningful. Thus, the
attitudes must be represented using a measurable value
function where the questionnaire is used as a tool for elic-
iting preferences. Conventional preference elicitation meth-
ods for approximating such value functions are typically
considered to be cognitively demanding [15]. The nature
of the actions being so loosely defined renders the use of
more elaborate preference elicitation techniques, since they
rely on well-defined alternatives. To resolve this situation,
the questionnaire we propose is inspired by the attitude
surveys often employing different versions of the Likert
scale.
An alternative approach to reducing the cognitive burden
of the decision-maker is to use preference disaggregation
techniques. The techniques do this by utilizing global pref-
erences, e.g., a ranking of a subset of alternatives, or by a
pairwise comparison of alternatives, to infer value functions;
see, e.g., [16–19] for details.
The questionnaire, which was previously reported in
[13, Ch. 7], enables the capturing of negative and positive
attitudes of the actions relative to a do nothing action.
Then, methods for cardinal ranking are used to interpret
the responses in terms of surrogate values and attribute
weights. Lastly, the questionnaire contains a section where
the respondent enters demographic information. This infor-
mation can then be used to analyze the preferences of the
citizens, e.g., to find stakeholder groups with conflicting
interests.
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2. Modeling of Preferences
In the decision analysis field, we distinguish between two
types of preference representation functions, the value
function and the utility function. A value function represents
preferences over certain outcomes, as opposed to the utility
function which represents preferences over lotteries with
uncertain outcomes, and the two representations are based
upon different axiom systems. The focus in this paper is
on preference representations under certainty, and in the
absence of uncertain consequences (or risk), preferences
over objects 𝑥 are typically represented by means of a value
function V(𝑥) 󳨃󳨀→ [0, 1], such that the object 𝑥 is preferred
to object 𝑦 (commonly denoted by 𝑥 ≻ 𝑦) by the decision-
maker if and only if V(𝑥) > V(𝑦). If V(𝑥) = V(𝑦) then the
decision-maker is indifferent between the two objects. The
value function is measurable and is defined over an interval
scale if V(𝑤) − V(𝑥) > V(𝑦) − V(𝑧) and V(𝑤) > V(𝑥), V(𝑦) >
V(𝑧) entails that exchanging 𝑥 for 𝑤 is preferred compared to
exchanging 𝑧 for 𝑦; see [20] for a comprehensive treatment.
In the case of multiple decision-makers or stakeholders𝑆1, 𝑆2, . . . , 𝑆𝑛 having different individual measurable value
functions V1(), V2(), . . . , V𝑛(), in group decision analysis, it is
of concern to aggregate the set of individual value functions
using some proper preference aggregation rule providing a
group value function sharing the properties of the individual
value functions. For this purpose, given that all individual
value functions of stakeholder 𝑘 are of the form V𝑘 and that
domain and range are shared among the stakeholders, it has
been shown that an additive aggregation of individual mea-
surable value functions provides a measurable group value
function 𝑊(𝐴𝑗) for an alternative 𝐴𝑗, such that 𝑊(𝐴𝑗) =∑𝜆𝑘V𝑘(𝐴𝑗), where V𝑘(𝐴𝑗) is the value of alternative 𝐴𝑗 for
stakeholder 𝑆𝑘, and 𝜆𝑘 are stakeholder scaling constants
subject to 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0 and ∑𝜆𝑖 = 1 whenever exchange
independence is satisfied (if all stakeholders are indifferent
between two exchanges then the whole group must also be
indifferent) [21].
In the multiattribute setting, considering a set of eval-
uation attributes 𝐺 = {𝐺1, 𝐺2, . . . , 𝐺𝑚}, the value of an
alternative 𝐴𝑗 is obtained by aggregating the corresponding
set of value functions V1(𝑥1), V2(𝑥2), . . . , V𝑚(𝑥𝑚). The most
common way of aggregation is the additive approach such
that the value 𝑉(𝐴𝑗) of 𝐴𝑗 is given by 𝑉(𝐴𝑗) = ∑𝑖 𝑤𝑖V𝑖𝑗,
where V𝑖𝑗 is the value of alternative 𝐴𝑗 under attribute 𝐺𝑖,
and 𝑤𝑖 is the weight of attribute 𝐺𝑖 under the condition that0 ≤ 𝑤𝑖 ≤ 1 and ∑𝑖𝑤𝑖 = 1. This additive aggregation
provides a measurable multiattribute value function given
that the conditions of mutually preferential independence
and difference independence hold; see, e.g., [22].The weights𝑤𝑖 then act as attribute scaling constants, scaling the value
contribution to an alternative from an attribute. The scaled
value 𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖 ⋅ V𝑖𝑗 is called the “part-worth” value of attribute𝐺𝑖 to alternative 𝐴𝑗. In a group setting, the group’s value of
alternative 𝐴𝑗 is then given by
𝑊(𝐴𝑗) = ∑
𝑘
𝜆𝑘∑
𝑖
𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 (1)
where 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 is the part-worth value of attribute 𝐺𝑖 to
alternative 𝐴𝑗 for stakeholder 𝑆𝑘; i.e., 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑘𝑖 ⋅V𝑘𝑖𝑗. Henceforth
in this paper, 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 notation for a stakeholders part-worth value
will be used, and we will denote the stakeholder 𝑆𝑘’s value
of alternative 𝐴𝑗 under attribute 𝐺𝑖 with V𝑘𝑖𝑗. In order to
obtain these values, different approaches have been suggested
to elicit them from decision-makers. For an overview of
elicitation methods, see, e.g., [22, 23].
3. Rank-Based Elicitation
The procedure in rank-ordering methods is to elicit the
preferences as ranks, which are then converted into cardinal
surrogate weights. Two such methods, rank-sum (RS) and
rank-reciprocal (RR), are described in [24], and a third
method the Rank Order Centroid (ROC) is described in
[25, 26].
Rank-ordering methods have desirable advantages over
more precise elicitation techniques, such as (i) being easier
to elicit the vague preferences (less cognitively demanding)
and (ii) having increased likelihood for a group to come to
agreement [27, 28]. But rank ordered weight elicitation may
be problematic. For example, Jia et al. [29] point out that,
in a real-life setting, uncertainty may exist regarding both
the magnitudes and ordering of weights, and even though
information regarding the difference in importance may
exist, the information is not considered in the transformation
from rank orders into weights.
A method taking the difference in importance into con-
sideration is the cardinal ranking (CAR) method [10, 30]. In
CAR, a prerequisite is an ordinal ranking, to which cardinal
information is added; see Figure 1 for a visualization of the
difference between ordinal and cardinal ranking.The cardinal
information is used to denote the strength of preference
between pairs of elements in the ranking. This strength of
preference is interpreted as the number of steps between
each pair of elements on an underlying importance scale.
The notation ≻𝑖 is used for describing this, where 𝑖 is the
number of steps.The cardinality can be described by semantic
expressions, e.g., obtained from a linguistic analysis,
∼0 equally important, 0 steps≻1 slightly more important, 1 step≻2 more important, 2 steps≻3 much more important, 3 steps
This enables the decision-maker to make statements such as
the following:
(i) Attribute A is equally important (∼0) as attribute B
(ii) Attribute B is slightly more important (≻1) than
attribute C
(iii) Attribute C is more important (≻2) than attribute D
(iv) Attribute D is much more important (≻3) than
attribute E
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A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
1 8765432
A1 A2 A3, A4 A5 A6
Figure 1: The left picture visualizes an ordinal ranking of six elements, while the right picture visualizes a cardinal ranking of the elements.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
A1 A2 A3 A4 A1 A2 A A3 A4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure 2:The left picture visualizes a cardinal ranking of the four alternatives.The right picture visualizes a cardinal ranking of the alternatives,
with the do nothing alternative inserted between alternatives𝐴2 and 𝐴3.
Note that similar linguistic translations are commonly
used in other MCDA methods such as AHP [31] and MAC-
BETH [32, 33].
The CAR method has been demonstrated using both
linear inequalities to represent cardinal ranking statements
[34] and closed formulas for obtaining surrogate weights [10,
30]. More recently, rank-based methods have been suggested
for probability elicitation as well, with a particular aim for use
in time scarce environments [35].
4. Cardinal Ranking for Conflict Evaluations
In this section we introduce an application of CAR which
captures negative or positive preferences with regard to an
alternative’s performance relative to a do nothing alternative
over a set of attributes. The method enables respondents to
express the strength of preference between ordered pairs of
alternatives using steps of preference intensities and at the
same time express whether the alternatives are negative or
positive relative to a do nothing alternative.
Assume thatwe have a set of alternatives𝐴 = {𝐴1, 𝐴2, . . . ,𝐴𝑛} which are evaluated against a set of attributes 𝐺 ={𝐺1, 𝐺2, . . . , 𝐺𝑚}. To capture the negative or positive prefer-
ences we need to introduce a do nothing alternative 𝐴𝛼 to the
set of alternatives. The do nothing alternative represents the
current state; i.e., it should be considered whether the actions
under consideration are better/worse than this alternative.
See, e.g., Lahdelma et al. [36] for arguments supporting this
technique.
We conform to the CAR method’s procedure for eliciting
the alternatives’ values [10, 30] but extend it with a third step,
the step where the do nothing alternative is inserted in the
ranking:
(1) An ordinal number is assigned to each position on the
underlying measurement scale.
(2) The underlying scale consists of 𝑄 positions in
decreasing order of importance. Alternative 𝐴 𝑖 has
a position 𝑝(𝑖) on the scale, such that 1 ≤ 𝑝(𝑖) ≤𝑄, where 𝑄 ≥ 𝑚. The strength, or cardinality,
of preference 𝑠𝑖 between two adjacent alternatives𝐴 𝑖≻𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑗, is then 𝑠𝑖 = |𝑝(𝑖) − 𝑝(𝑗)|.
(3) A do nothing alternative 𝐴𝛼 is inserted into the
ranking by providing it with a position 𝑝.
(4) The cardinal ranking is normalized to a proportional[0, 1]-value scale according to the following equation:
VCAR𝑖 = 𝑄 − 𝑝 (𝑖)𝑄 − 1 (2)
4.1. Example of CAR for Conflict Evaluations. Assume that
a decision-maker evaluates the performance of four alterna-
tives, {𝐴1, . . . , 𝐴4}, with regard to attribute 𝐶1.
(1) The decision-maker orders the alternatives as 𝐴1 ≻𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴3 ≻ 𝐴4.
(2) He/she adds cardinal information to the ordinal
ranking by introducing cardinality (strength of pref-
erence) steps between pairs of alternatives:
(i) 𝐴1 is much better (≻3) than 𝐴2,
(ii) 𝐴2 is better (≻2) than 𝐴3
(iii) 𝐴3 is much better (≻3) than 𝐴4,
which gives the following cardinal rank 𝐴1≻3𝐴2≻2𝐴3≻3𝐴4; see Figure 2.
(3) He/she states that alternatives 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 are consid-
ered to be positive and 𝐴3 and 𝐴4 negative relative
to the do nothing alternative. The do nothing alter-
native 𝐴𝛼 is therefore inserted at position 0, between𝐴2 and 𝐴3, giving the following cardinal ranking,𝐴1≻3𝐴2≻1𝐴𝛼≻1𝐴3≻3𝐴4; see Figure 2.
(4) The cardinal ranking results in the following positions
on the underlying scale:
(i) 𝐴1 at position 𝑝(4),
(ii) 𝐴2 at position 𝑝(1),
(iii) 𝐴𝛼 at position 𝑝(0),
(iv) 𝐴3 at position 𝑝(−1),
(v) 𝐴4 at position 𝑝(−4).
These positions are then mapped onto a proportional[0, 1]-value scale, giving the alternatives the following
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values, where V𝑖𝑗 denotes alternative 𝐴𝑗:s value under
attribute 𝐺𝑖. As [37] points out, the do nothing
alternative is not always assigned a score of 0. Note
that in our approach the do nothing alternative can
be assigned a value between 0 and 1 depending on its
position in the ordinal ranking. In this example,𝑄 = 9
and 𝑝(4) = 1, 𝑝(1) = 4, 𝑝(0) = 5, 𝑝(−1) = 6 and𝑝(−4) = 9.
(i) V4 = 1.000,
(ii) V3 = 0.625,
(iii) V𝛼 = 0.500,
(iv) V2 = 0.375,
(v) V1 = 0.000.
4.2. Conflicts. In a group decision analysis setting, it may
be of interest to investigate whether a certain alternative is
conflict-prone with respect to one or more attributes. The
preferences elicited in the application of CAR for conflict
evaluations can be used for assessing the level of conflict
within or between stakeholder groups. In the following
section, we will propose two such indices, the within-group
conflict index and the between-group conflict index. Based
upon these indices we can define consensus properties that
textually describe the level of conflict associated with an
attribute with respect to a specific alternative. A similar
approach was presented by Bana e Costa [12].
Before presenting the indices, we stipulate the following
conditions for the concept of conflict.
Definition 1 (conflict). Given a set of stakeholders 𝑆 and a set
of alternatives 𝐴, conflict exists in 𝑆 if there are two or more
stakeholders in 𝑆 with positive scaling constants and these
have differing preferences towards at least one alternative𝐴 𝑖 ∈ 𝐴. Formally, there must exist 𝑆𝑘, 𝑆𝑙 ∈ 𝑆 with 𝜆𝑘, 𝜆𝑙 > 0
such that V𝑘𝑗 < V𝑘𝛼 and V𝑙𝑗 ≥ V𝑙𝛼.
Definition 1 explicitly says that if all stakeholders share
preferences towards an alternative, there is no conflict. In
this sense it can be argued that this definition is a very
strong definition of conflict. In the case of multiple attributes,
Definition 1 can be extended to attribute conflict. Needless to
say, given an attribute 𝐺𝑖 with a positive weight 𝑤𝑖 > 0 we
have that V𝑘𝑖𝑗 < V𝑘𝑖𝛼 implies 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 < 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼 and V𝑘𝑖𝑗 ≥ V𝑘𝑖𝛼 implies𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼 since 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖V𝑘𝑖𝑗. We can now define the meaning
behind attribute conflict and measurable conflict.
Definition 2 (attribute conflict). Given a set of stakeholders
𝑆, a set of alternatives 𝐴, and a set of evaluation attributes 𝐺,
conflict exists for𝐺𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 if there exist 𝑆𝑘, 𝑆𝑙 ∈ 𝑆with𝜆𝑘, 𝜆𝑙 > 0
such that 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 < 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼 and 𝑞𝑙𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑞𝑙𝑖𝛼.
4.2.1. Measurable Conflict. The definitions above do not
consider different opinions on how “good” (or “bad”) two
alternatives are given that they are both considered as pro-
ductive (or counter-productive) to count for conflict. In other
words, the definitions do not account for value differences,
which lead us to measurable conflict.
In a two-stakeholder setting, given that attribute conflict
exists for attribute 𝐺𝑖 such that 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 < 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼 and 𝑞𝑙𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑞𝑙𝑖𝛼, we will
argue that it is reasonable to base a measure of conflict upon
the value differences:
𝑑𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼 − 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 (3)
The intuition behind (3) is that stakeholder 𝑆𝑘 considers𝐴𝑗 to be |𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼−𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗|worse than the do nothing alternative while
another stakeholder 𝑆𝑙 considers𝐴𝑗 to be |𝑞𝑙𝑖𝛼−𝑞𝑙𝑖𝑗| better than
the do nothing alternative. Given two stakeholders 𝑆𝑘, 𝑆𝑙 and
two alternatives 𝐴1, 𝐴2 such that
𝑞𝑘𝑖1 ≤ 𝑞𝑘𝑖2 ≤ 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼 (4)
𝑞𝑙𝑖1 ≥ 𝑞𝑙𝑖2 ≥ 𝑞𝑙𝑖𝛼, (5)
then conflict cannot be smaller for 𝐴2 compared to 𝐴1.
Further, conflict is larger for 𝐴1 compared to 𝐴2 if 𝑆𝑘 would
rather exchange 𝐴1 for 𝐴𝛼 than exchange 𝐴2 for 𝐴𝛼, or if 𝑆𝑙
would rather exchange 𝐴𝛼 for 𝐴1 than exchange 𝐴𝛼 for 𝐴2.
However, a generalized measure of conflict should con-
sider more than two stakeholders. In addition to measuring
how far from the do nothing alternative two stakeholders
in conflict are, we need to consider disparities between
sets of stakeholders. For this reason we adopt a cluster
distance approach to conflict measurement by partitioning
the stakeholders into two sets based upon their preferences
towards the alternative.
Let 𝑆 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, . . . , 𝑆𝑛} be a set of stakeholders. For each
attribute 𝐺𝑖 and alternative 𝐴𝑗, we partition the stakeholder
set 𝑆 into two partitions, the con-group 𝑆−𝑖𝑗 and the pro-group
𝑆
+
𝑖𝑗. The members of the 𝑆
−
𝑖𝑗 evaluated V
𝑘
𝑖𝑗 to be less than the
value of the do nothing alternative V𝑘𝑖𝛼, and the stakeholders
in 𝑆+𝑖𝑗 evaluated V
𝑘
𝑖𝑗 to be greater than or equal to V
𝑘
𝑖𝛼; see the
following equations:
𝑆
−
𝑖𝑗 = {𝑆𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 : V𝑘𝑖𝑗 < V𝑘𝑖𝛼}𝑛𝑘=1 (6)
𝑆
+
𝑖𝑗 = {𝑆𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 : V𝑘𝑖𝑗 ≥ V𝑘𝑖𝛼}𝑛𝑘=1 (7)
Hence, the do nothing alternative 𝐴𝛼 is used to separate
the stakeholders into either 𝑆−𝑖𝑗 or 𝑆
+
𝑖𝑗. The intuition behind
the conflict index is to measure the distance between these
two groups such that if two stakeholders 𝑆𝑘 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝑙 ∈ 𝑆+𝑖𝑗 in
general disagree to a large extent, i.e., they both have a large
differences |𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼 −𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗| and |𝑞𝑙𝑖𝛼−𝑞𝑙𝑖𝑗|, then the conflict is greater
than if they have smaller differences. Further, it can be argued
that if the power balance between 𝑆−𝑖𝑗 and 𝑆
+
𝑖𝑗 is more equal,
then the conflict is stronger since it has been demonstrated
that less powerful stakeholders are more willing to accept an
alternative even though they deem it counterproductive [38].
In our case, this is represented as follows: if the difference
∑
𝑆𝑘∈𝑆
−
𝑖𝑗
𝜆𝑘 − ∑
𝑆𝑙∈𝑆
+
𝑖𝑗
𝜆𝑙 (8)
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Table 1: The positions on the underlying measurement scale produced by the cardinal rankings.
Stakeholder Position𝑆𝑘 𝑝(𝐴1) 𝑝(𝐴2) 𝑝(𝐴3) 𝑝(𝐴4) 𝑝(𝐴5) 𝑝(𝐴𝛼)𝑆1 8 6 8 1 1 8𝑆2 8 6 8 1 1 8𝑆3 8 7 8 2 1 8𝑆4 8 7 8 3 1 8𝑆5 8 7 8 3 1 8𝑆6 1 2 1 5 8 1𝑆7 1 2 1 5 8 1𝑆8 1 2 1 6 8 1𝑆9 1 3 1 7 8 1𝑆10 1 3 2 7 8 1
is small, then the power balance ismore equal entailing larger
conflict.
To measure these properties reflecting the distance
between the groups, we utilize three sums of squares similarly
to howWard’s clusteringmethodmeasures distances between
clusters [11, p. 466]. We obtain the sum of squared differences
between each 𝑑𝑘𝑖𝑗 and the group’s mean distance, i.e., the
differences
𝑑𝑘𝑖𝑗 − ∑𝑆𝑘∈𝑆𝑖𝑗 𝑑
𝑘
𝑖𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑆𝑖𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 (9)
for the con-group (12), the pro-group (13), and the combined
group (14), respectively.
Definition 3 (within-group conflict index). A within-group
conflict index 𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑗 for stakeholder set 𝑆 with two or more
stakeholders, under attribute 𝐺𝑖 and alternative 𝐴𝑗, is given
by
𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑗 = √𝛽 (𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑗 − (𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗)) (10)
where
𝛽 = 1∑𝑆𝑘∈𝑆 𝜆𝑘2 (11)
𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗 = ∑
𝑆𝑘∈𝑆
−
𝑖𝑗
𝜆𝑘2(𝑑𝑘𝑖𝑗 − ∑𝑆𝑘∈𝑆−𝑖𝑗 𝑑
𝑘
𝑖𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑆−𝑖𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 )
2
(12)
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗 = ∑
𝑆𝑘∈𝑆
+
𝑖𝑗
𝜆𝑘2(𝑑𝑘𝑖𝑗 − ∑𝑆𝑘∈𝑆+𝑖𝑗 𝑑
𝑘
𝑖𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑆+𝑖𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 )
2
(13)
𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑗 = ∑
𝑆𝑘∈𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝜆𝑘2(𝑑𝑘𝑖𝑗 − ∑𝑆𝑘∈𝑆𝑖𝑗 𝑑
𝑘
𝑖𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑆𝑖𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 )
2
(14)
In (10), 𝛽 is used to normalize the value onto [0, 1]. It can
be noted that 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑗 ≤ 1, where 𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 1 occurs when all
stakeholders in the con-group rank such that 𝑞𝑖𝛼 = 1 and 𝑞𝑖𝑗 =
0, and all stakeholders in the pro-group rank such that 𝑞𝑖𝛼 = 0
and 𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 1 and the power balance is equal. Further, 𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 0
occurs if either the con-group or the pro-group is empty.
4.3. Consensus Properties. The semantic meaning of the
conflict indices can then be explained by dividing the conflict
range [0, 1] into a number of subintervals each describing a
certain level of consensus. We define the points 𝑎 and 𝑏 as
the interval’s lower and upper bound and stipulate 𝑛 interval
points {𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛−1, 𝑥𝑛}. These points are to divide the
scale into the 𝑛 intervals such as [𝑎, 𝑥1], [𝑥1, 𝑥2], . . . , [𝑥𝑛−1, 𝑏].
Each interval is then associated with a consensus property
label describing the level of consensus, e.g., consensus aligned
attribute, potentially controversial attribute, and controversial
attribute, with regard to a specific action.
4.4. Example. Assume that ten stakeholders 𝑆 = {𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆10}
evaluate the performance of five actions {𝐴1, . . . , 𝐴5}, with
regard to attribute 𝐺1 using CAR for conflict evaluations.
The actions’ positions on the underlying measurement are
presented in Table 1 and the normalized values in Table 2.
Attribute 𝐺1 is for illustrative purposes given the weight of
1.
Properties of𝐺1 for each action can now be defined. First,
we stipulate classes of controversy based upon the magnitude
of conflict. Assume four such classes which range from
“consensus aligned”, i.e., low conflict, to “very controversial”
where the conflict is high; see Table 3. Note that the subranges
and the semantical labels are defined by the authors for
illustrative purposes. In a real setting the ranges and labels
should be defined by the decision-maker.
To analyze conflict within the stakeholder group, for each
action we form a con-group (6) and a pro-group (7) and
subsequentially calculate the squared distance within the
con-group (12) and the pro-group (13), the squared distance
between the con- and pro-group (14), and the within-group
conflict index 𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑗 (10).
The results are shown in Table 4. Action 𝐴1 has 𝑑𝑆1,1 = 0;
i.e., there exists no conflict between the stakeholders since
all stakeholders are members of the pro-group and no stake-
holders are members of the con-group. As seen in Table 2,
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Table 2: The stakeholders’ cardinal rankings normalized to a proportional [0, 1]-value scale.
Stakeholder Value Weight𝑆𝑘 V𝑘1,1 V𝑘1,2 V𝑘1,3 V𝑘1,4 V𝑘1,5 V𝑘1,𝛼 𝑤1𝑆1 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00𝑆2 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00𝑆3 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.86 1.00 0.00 1.00𝑆4 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.71 1.00 0.00 1.00𝑆5 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.71 1.00 0.00 1.00𝑆6 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00𝑆7 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00𝑆8 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.00𝑆9 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 1.00𝑆10 1.00 0.71 0.86 0.14 0.00 1.00 1.00
Table 3: The table shows four conflict index intervals, each associ-
ated with a consensus property label which semantically describes
the level of consensus.
Conflict index interval Consensus property label[0.00, 0.10) Consensus aligned[0.10, 0.20) Potentially controversial[0.20, 0.50) Controversial[0.50, 1.00] Very controversial
all stakeholders placed 𝐴1 on the same position as 𝐴𝛼 in
the cardinal ranking. However, stakeholders 𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆5 stated
that all other actions were better than 𝐴1, and stakeholders𝑆6, . . . , 𝑆10 stated that all other actions were worse than action𝐴1. Thus, when the ranking was normalized to proportional[0, 1]-value scale, the value of action 𝐴1 for stakeholders𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆5was V𝑘1,1=0, and for stakeholders 𝑆6 , . . . , 𝑆10 the value
was V𝑘1,1=1. Action𝐴2 has d𝑆1,2 = 0.2, since both the con-group
and the pro-group estimated the value of action to lie close to𝐴𝛼. Action𝐴3 has an even lower conflict index,𝑑𝑆1,3 = 0.0429,
since all stakeholders except one are members of the pro-
group. The pro-group members estimated the value of 𝐴3 to
be equal to the value of𝐴𝛼, and themember of the con-group
estimated the value of 𝐴3 to be slightly less than the value of𝐴𝛼. Action 𝐴4 has 𝑑𝑆1,4 = 0.7857 since, as seen in Table 2,
the stakeholders of both groups estimated it to lie closer
towards the most preferred or least preferred alternative for
both groups, action 𝐴5. Lastly, action 𝐴5 has 𝑑𝑆1,5 = 1, since
all members of the con- and pro-group estimate it to be the
worst and, respectively, best action. See the classification of
the actions in Table 5.
Note that the conflict index measures the disagreement
between the con-group and the pro-group. If either the con-
group or the pro-group is empty, 𝐶𝑆𝑗𝑖 (or 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗) cancels 𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑗 out.
4.5. Between-Group Conflict Index. Of interest for the appli-
cation case was first to measure the conflict within one
group of stakeholders, i.e., the within-group conflict index.
Second, it was of interest to measure the conflict between two
stakeholder groups, e.g., people living in different parts of the
town or belonging to different generations.
The between-group conflict index measures the conflict
between two stakeholder groups. The intuition behind the
between-group conflict index is that if the two groups
disagree to the same extent on the same matters, there is
low conflict between the groups. The between-group conflict
should thus reveal to what extent two groups disagree
differently from each other. Let 𝐷 and 𝐸 be two subsets of
𝑆. For each alternative 𝐴𝑗 and attribute 𝐺𝑖, we partition 𝐷
and 𝐸 into two partitions: the con-group 𝑆𝐷−𝑖𝑗 and the pro-
group 𝑆𝐷+𝑖𝑗 for 𝐷, and the con-group 𝑆𝐸−𝑖𝑗 and the pro-group
𝑆
𝐸+
𝑖𝑗 for 𝐸. The members of 𝑆𝐷−𝑖𝑗 and 𝑆𝐸−𝑖𝑗 estimated the part-
worth value 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 to be less than the part-worth value of the
do nothing alternative 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼, and the members of 𝑆𝐷+𝑖𝑗 and 𝑆𝐸+𝑖𝑗
estimated it to be greater than or equal to 𝑞𝑗𝑖𝛼 ; see the following
equation:
𝑆
𝐷−
𝑖𝑗 = {𝑆𝑘 ∈ 𝐷 : 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 < 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼}𝑛𝑗=1
𝑆
𝐷+
𝑖𝑗 = {𝑆𝑘 ∈ 𝐷 : 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼}𝑛𝑗=1
𝑆
𝐸−
𝑖𝑗 = {𝑆𝑘 ∈ 𝐸 : 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 < 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼}𝑛𝑗=1
𝑆
𝐸+
𝑖𝑗 = {𝑆𝑘 ∈ 𝐸 : 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑞𝑘𝑖𝛼}𝑛𝑗=1
(15)
The squared distances within the con-group 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗 , 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗, 𝐶𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗
(12), and the pro-group 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑗 , 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑗 , 𝑃𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 (13), and the squared
distance between the con- and pro-group 𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑗 , 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑗 , 𝑇𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 (14)
for groups 𝐷 and 𝐸 are then obtained according to the given
equations. The conflict with respect to alternative 𝐴𝑗 under
attribute 𝐺𝑖 between the two groups 𝐷 and 𝐸 can now be
represented by the between-group conflict index 𝑑𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 .
Definition 4 (between-group conflict index).
𝑑𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 = √𝛽 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨(𝑇𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 − (𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑗)) − ( (𝐶𝐷,𝐸 − (𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗)) + (𝑃𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 − (𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑗 ))󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 where 𝛽 = 1∑
𝑆𝑘∈𝑆
𝜆𝑘2 (16)
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Table 4: The distance within the con- and pro-group, the distance between the con- and pro-group, and the conflict index.
𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4 𝐴5𝐶𝑆1𝑗 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000𝑃𝑆1𝑗 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000𝑇𝑆1𝑗 0.0000 0.0045 0.0002 0.0634 0.1000
𝑑
𝑆
1𝑗 0.0000 0.2000 0.0429 0.7857 1.0000
Table 5: The classification of the actions consensus properties.
Consensus Property 𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4 𝐴5
Consensus aligned × ×
Potentially controversial ×
Controversial
Very controversial × ×
Table 6: The con- and pro-indices for both groups and the conflict between the groups.
𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4 𝐴5𝐶𝐷𝑖1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000𝑃𝐷𝑖1 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000𝑇𝐷𝑖1 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000𝐶𝐸𝑖1 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000𝑃𝐸𝑖1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000𝑇𝐸𝑖1 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 0.0000𝐶𝐷,𝐸𝑖1 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000𝑃𝐷,𝐸𝑖1 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000𝑇𝐷,𝐸𝑖1 0.0000 0.0045 0.0002 0.0634 0.1000𝑑𝐷,𝐸𝑖1 0.0000 0.2000 0.0143 0.7857 1.0000
The intuition behind the between-group conflict index is
that conflict increases when two stakeholder groups’ con- and
pro-groups have greater value differences between them.This
can be noted by observing that 0 ≤ 𝑑𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 ≤ 1, where 𝑑𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 1
when the two stakeholders groups have opposing preferences;
for example, 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝐶𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 0,𝑃𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝑇𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 1; i.e., (1 − (0 + 0)) − ((0 −(0 + 0)) + (0 − (0 + 0))) = 1.
4.6. Example. Using the preference data in Table 2, we divide
the group of stakeholders into two sets,𝐷 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3, 𝑆4, 𝑆5}
and 𝐸 = {𝑆6, 𝑆7, 𝑆8, 𝑆9, 𝑆10}, based on some demographic
variable, e.g., age or sex. These sets are further divided into
the con-group sets 𝑆𝐷−𝑖𝑗 and 𝑆
𝐸−
𝑖𝑗 and the pro-group sets 𝑆
𝐷+
𝑖𝑗
and 𝑆𝐸+𝑖𝑘 . The conflict between the stakeholder groups is then
given by the conflict index𝑑𝐷,𝐸𝑖𝑗 .The results of the calculations
are presented in Table 6.
As in the within-group conflict index, the between-group
conflict index range is [0, 1]. In this example we use the
consensus properties defined in the within-group example in
Section 4.4; see the conflict index intervals and the associated
consensus properties in Table 3.
As seen in Table 6, the result for action 𝐴1 is 𝑑𝐷,𝐸1,1 = 0,
since there is no conflict between the groups. Table 2 shows
that all stakeholders of both subsets 𝐷 (𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆5) and 𝐸
(𝑆6, . . . , 𝑆10) are members of the pro-group and that they all
placed𝐴1 on the same position as𝐴𝛼 in the cardinal ranking;
i.e., no con-groups exist. The stakeholders in 𝐷 expressed
that all other actions were better than 𝐴1, and stakeholders
in 𝐸 expressed that all other actions were worse than action𝐴1. Thus, when the ranking was normalized to proportional[0, 1]-value scale, the value for 𝐴1 was V𝑘1,1=0 for 𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆5,
and V𝑘1,1=1 for 𝑆6, . . . , 𝑆10. Action 𝐴2 has 𝑑𝐷,𝐸1,2 = 0.2, since
the two stakeholder groups have similar preferences. Both
groups estimated the value of the action to lie close to 𝐴𝛼.
Action 𝐴3 has 𝑑𝐷,𝐸1,3 = 0.0143, note that this is because only
stakeholder 𝑆10 estimates that the action is negative, and all
other stakeholders estimate it to be equal to 𝐴𝛼. Action 𝐴4
has 𝑑𝐷,𝐸1,4 = 0.7857, since the two stakeholder groups have
opposing preferences, as seen inTable 2. Action𝐴5 has𝑑𝐷,𝐸1,5 =1, since all members of𝐷 estimate that the action is the best
of all actions, and all members of 𝐸 estimate that the action is
the worst of all actions. The results of the classification of the
actions are presented in Table 7.
5. Application of CAR for Conflict Evaluations
at Upplands Väsby Municipality
In a current research project, researchers from Stockholm
University cooperate with the Royal Institute of Technology
Advances in Operations Research 9
Table 7: The classification of the actions consensus properties.
Consensus Property 𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4 𝐴5
Consensus aligned × ×
Potentially controversial ×
Controversial
Very Controversial × ×
Table 8: Analysis I: the number of members of the con- and pro-groups, the con- and pro-indices, and the conflict in the total population.
𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4 𝐴5|𝑆−8𝑗| 88 11 24 133 120|𝑆+8𝑗| 851 928 915 806 819𝐶𝑆8𝑗 1.04 ⋅ 10−7 2.74 ⋅ 10−8 7.32 ⋅ 10−8 1.64 ⋅ 10−7 1.52 ⋅ 10−7𝑃𝑆8𝑗 4.91 ⋅ 10−6 5.57 ⋅ 10−6 5.54 ⋅ 10−6 4.87 ⋅ 10−6 4.68 ⋅ 10−6𝑇𝑆8𝑗 7.12 ⋅ 10−6 6.01 ⋅ 10−6 6.25 ⋅ 10−6 7.09 ⋅ 10−6 6.64 ⋅ 10−6
𝑑
𝑆
8𝑗 0.0444 0.0197 0.0244 0.0440 0.0412
in developing models for public planning and decision
processes in Swedish municipalities. We investigate how to
increase expressiveness of themedia used for communication
between the parties in these processes. The focus here lies
on developing tools that enrich this kind of communication.
As a part of the project we conduct three case studies, of
which one is in cooperation with civil servants and politicians
at Upplands Va¨sby (UV), a municipality in the Stockholm
region.
5.1. A Case Study. As reported in [13, Ch. 7], the politi-
cians and civil servants wanted to get in-depth information
regarding the citizens preferences regarding actions, which
possibly could be implemented in the future. It was espe-
cially of interest to investigate if there were any actions
that potentially could lead to citizen conflicts. To facilitate
this, it was decided to use a web-based questionnaire (the
Appendix) as a front-end for preference elicitation. The
content of the questionnaire was developed together with
civil servants at UV. The questionnaire consisted of four
parts:
Part I consisted of ten questions regarding different
“focus areas” (or criteria in an MCDA setting). Under each
focus area, the respondents used an implementation of CAR
for conflict evaluations to rank five actions; see Figure 3.
Part II consisted of one question where the ten focus
areas are given weights using an implementation of CAR; see
Figure 4.
Part III consisted of three questions where the respon-
dents stated their preferences regarding two contradicting
actions.
Part IV consisted of questions regarding demographic
information.
An invitation letter containing aURL to the questionnaire
was sent by mail to 10,000 citizens. The sample was chosen
by conducting simple random sampling on a sampling frame
consisting of 31,408 citizens. In the section below we present
an analysis of the results from the eighth focus area, School.
In total we received 939 answers; of these 465 were male, 456
female, 15 did not want to disclose their gender, and 3 selected
other/agender. The analysis consists of two parts, the analysis
of (i) the difference in preferences in the total population and
(ii) the difference in preference between females and males.
5.1.1. Results. Five actions𝐴1, . . . , 𝐴5 are evaluated under the
focus area/attribute 𝐺8 School:
(i) 𝐴1 reduces preschool child groups.
(ii) 𝐴2 raises the quality of teaching.
(iii) 𝐴3 increases professional development for schools
and teachers.
(iv) 𝐴4 increases modern information technology (IT) in
education.
(v) 𝐴5 involves caretakers more in school.
The respondents assess the affect associated with each
action with regard to a do nothing alternative (current state).
Note that this assessment may not be related to the cost of
implementing the action, rather the feeling/affect related to
the implementation. In the questionnaire implementation of
the CAR for conflict evaluations (Figure 3) the do nothing
alternative is represented by the tick mark located in the
middle of the scale.
Analysis I: Conflict in the Population. In the first
analysis we investigate the difference in preference in the
total population. We used four consensus property labels to
semantically describe the level of conflict. The within-group
conflict index range [0, 1] was divided into four subranges
each representing one level of consensus; see Table 3. Note
that the subranges and the consensus properties are defined
by the authors for illustrative purposes.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8. The
results show that all actions have a very low conflict index,
indicating that the respondents have similar preferences.
Actions 𝐴1 (𝑑𝑆8,1 = 0.0444), 𝐴4 (𝑑𝑆8,1 = 0.0440), and 𝐴5
(𝑑𝑆8,5 = 0.0412) have the largest conflict indices. Actions 𝐴3
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Figure 3: Question 1 from Part 1 of the questionnaire translated to English. A handle on the slider represents one action. Actions to the left
of “Neither good nor bad” are regarded to be worse, and actions to the right are considered to be better than the do nothing action. The
preference intensity is represented by a colored gradient on the slider (red to the left of Neither good nor bad, and green to the right). A
textual description of the strength of preference between pairs of actions is found underneath the slider.The questionnaire text was originally
in Swedish.
Figure 4: The weighting of the focus areas translated to English. A handle on the slider represents one focus area. The importance of a focus
area is represented by the blue colored gradient on the slider, and the rightmost focus area is the most important one. A textual description
of the strength of preference between pairs of actions is found underneath the slider. The questionnaire text was originally in Swedish.
and 𝐴2 have the lowest conflict indices of 𝑑𝑆8,3 = 0.0244
and 𝑑𝑆8,2 = 0.0197, respectively. The attribute properties are
presented in Table 9, showing that all actions are consensus
aligned.
Analysis II: The Difference in Preference between
Females andMales. In the second analysis we investigate the
difference in preference between females and males. We use
the same consensus property labels as in the first analysis to
semantically describe the level of conflict.Thebetween-group
conflict index range [0, 1] was divided into four subranges
each representing one level of consensus; see Table 3. Note
that the consensus properties are defined by the authors for
illustrative purposes.
The results of the calculations are presented in Table 10.
All actions have very low conflict indices, which also is
reflected in the attribute properties (Table 11), where all
actions are consensus aligned. The action with the highest
conflict index is 𝐴1 (𝑑𝑆8,1 = 0.0107), followed by 𝐴4 (𝑑𝑆8,4 =0.0052), 𝐴3 (𝑑𝑆8,3 = 0.0027), 𝐴5 (𝑑𝑆8,5 = 0.0019), and 𝐴2
(𝑑𝑆8,2 = 0.0005). The difference in value between the actions’
conflict indices is small since both groups have very similar
preferences.
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Table 9: Analysis I: the classification of the actions consensus properties.
Consensus Property 𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4 𝐴5
Consensus aligned × × × × ×
Potentially controversial
Controversial
Very Controversial
Table 10: Analysis II: the number of members of the con- and pro-groups, the con- and pro-indices, and the conflict between females and
males.
𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4 𝐴5|𝑆𝐷−8𝑗 | 25 6 10 60 57|𝑆𝐷+8𝑗 | 431 450 446 396 399|𝑆𝐸−8𝑗 | 60 5 13 69 61|𝑆𝐸+8𝑗 | 405 460 452 396 404𝐶𝐷8𝑗 3.60 ⋅ 10−8 1.29 ⋅ 10−8 6.00 ⋅ 10−8 6.45 ⋅ 10−8 6.87 ⋅ 10−8𝑃𝐷8𝑗 2.39 ⋅ 10−6 2.70 ⋅ 10−6 2.68 ⋅ 10−6 2.07 ⋅ 10−6 2.31 ⋅ 10−6𝑇𝐷8𝑗 3.20 ⋅ 10−6 2.94 ⋅ 10−6 3.07 ⋅ 10−6 2.95 ⋅ 10−6 3.20 ⋅ 10−6𝐶𝐸8𝑗 6.82 ⋅ 10−8 1.56 ⋅ 10−8 6.20 ⋅ 10−9 9.61 ⋅ 10−8 8.70 ⋅ 10−8𝑃𝐸8𝑗 2.57 ⋅ 10−6 3.02 ⋅ 10−6 3.03 ⋅ 10−6 2.85 ⋅ 10−6 2.52 ⋅ 10−6𝑇𝐸8𝑗 3.86 ⋅ 10−6 3.24 ⋅ 10−6 3.33 ⋅ 10−6 4.23 ⋅ 10−6 3.62 ⋅ 10−6𝐶𝐷,𝐸8𝑗 1.05 ⋅ 10−7 2.85 ⋅ 10−8 7.39 ⋅ 10−8 1.61 ⋅ 10−7 1.57 ⋅ 10−7𝑃𝐷,𝐸8𝑗 5.05 ⋅ 10−6 5.72 ⋅ 10−6 5.71 ⋅ 10−6 4.99 ⋅ 10−6 4.83 ⋅ 10−6𝑇𝐷,𝐸8𝑗 7.27 ⋅ 10−6 6.18 ⋅ 10−6 6.41 ⋅ 10−6 7.22 ⋅ 10−6 6.82 ⋅ 10−6
𝑑
𝐷,𝐸
8𝑗 0.0107 0.0005 0.0027 0.0052 0.0019
Table 11: Analysis II: the classification of the actions consensus properties.
Consensus Property 𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4 𝐴5
Consensus aligned × × × × ×
Potentially controversial
Controversial
Very Controversial
6. Concluding Remarks
Public decision problems can be complex. They involve
multiple actions and multiple stakeholders which may have
conflicting preferences with regard to the actions. A problem
in such situations is that these opposing preferences might
lead to conflicts between stakeholders, which may lead to
delays in the decision process. An approach that can be used
to increase the understanding of the stakeholders’ opinions
is to allow them to state their opinions, e.g., by using a web-
based questionnaire.
In this paper, we showed how the CAR method can
be applied, enabling respondents to state negative or posi-
tive preferences with regard to an alternative’s performance
relative to a do nothing alternative. We applied CAR for
conflict evaluations in a case study conducted in cooperation
with Upplands Va¨sby municipality. The citizens’ preferences
were elicited by a web-based questionnaire that used an
implementation of the method. We showed how the method
can be used to highlight conflict between and within different
stakeholders groups and how the conflict can be conceptu-
alized into semantic attribute properties. The results of such
an analysis can aid decision-makers in the process of making
well-informed decisions by clarifying the actions that can be
conflict-prone.
Appendix
The Questionnaire
Part I. What Should Upplands Va¨sby Focus on in the Future?
(1) Parks and greenbelts
(1a) Preserve existing larger greenbelts
(1b) Build parks in existing urban districts
(1c) Build homes near greenbelts
(1d) Renovate existing parks
(1e) Improve accessibility to major greenbelts
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(2) Diversity in housing supply
(2a) Offer more housing types
(2b) Offer more apartment sizes
(2c) Offer small-scale land ownership
(2d) Preserve the conceptual foundations of the
buildings from the 1970s
(2e) Offer more housing near the water
(3) Vitalize common places
(3a) Mix different types of traffic
(3b) Place parking along the streets
(3c) Turn entrances to streets
(3d) Place public locales in transparent ground floors
(3e) Secure parking solutions under houses
(4) Communications
(4a) Pair the new streets with existing ones to
strengthen the connection to the adjacent
neighborhoods and reduce the barriers that the
main roads pose.
(4b) Improve communications at night between var-
ious parts of the municipality
(4c) Improve communications to and from Uppsala
(4d) Improve the north-south and east-west routes
through a fine-mesh and well-integrated
metropolitan area networks.
(4e) Improve communications to and from down-
town Stockholm
(5) Culture and recreation
(5a) Expand the range of cultural sports and recre-
ational activities
(5b) Create better opportunities for festivals and
concerts
(5c) Create more opportunities for outdoor sports
(5d) Create outdoors marketplaces
(5e) Provide municipal grants for cultural and recre-
ational projects
(6) Education
(6a) Renovate older schools
(6b) Build new schools
(6c) Improve the physical environment of school-
yards
(6d) Improve the quality of primary education
(6e) Improve the quality of secondary education
(7) Care
(7a) Increase cultural and recreational activities for
the elderly
(7b) Increase cultural and recreational activities for
children and young people
(7c) Improve care for the elderly in the municipality
(7d) Increase youth centres and field assistants
(7e) Reduce preschool child groups
(8) School
(8a) Reduce preschool child groups
(8b) Raise the quality of teaching
(8c) Increase professional development for schools
and teachers
(8d) Increase modern information technology (IT)
in education
(8e) Involve caretakers more in school
(9) Safety
(9a) Increase safety around the station area
(9b) Increase police presence in central Va¨sby
(9c) Improve the lighting in the centre of Va¨sby
(9d) Narrow opening hours for alcohol outlets in
central Va¨sby
(9e) Extend the opening hours of shops in the city
center
(10) Sustainable development
(10a) Reduce energy consumption
(10b) Reduce transport and sound pollution
(10c) Increase climate change adaptation and recy-
cling
(10d) Prioritize environmentally friendly transport
modes (walking, cycling, public transport)
(10e) Reducing environmental toxins and hazardous
chemicals in nature
Part II. How Important Is Each Focus Area?
(11) Weighting
(1) Parks and greenbelts
(2) Diversity in housing supply
(3) Vitalize common places
(4) Communication
(5) Culture and recreation
(6) Education
(7) Care
(8) School
(9) Safety
(10) Sustainable development
Part III. Contradictions
(12) Water or housing
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(12a) Build homes near water
(12b) Preserving nature and shorelines intact
(13) Services or green areas
(13a) Densify the city centre and increase the range of
services
(13b) Preserve green areas
(14) Regional centre or smaller urban areas
(14a) Develop central Upplands Va¨sby
(14b) Develop smaller urban areas
Part IV. Your Background
(i) Where do you live? (This question consisted of 41
residential areas to choose among)
(ii) What is your highest level of education?
(a) Not finished elementary school or equivalent
compulsory school
(b) High school or equivalent compulsory school
(c) High school, folk high-school or equivalent
(d) College/university
(e) Other post-secondary education
(f) Postgraduate
(iii) What is your main occupation?
(a) Employed
(b) Self-employed
(c) Student
(d) Pensioner/retired
(e) Sickness or activity compensation
(f) Long term sick leave (more than 3 months)
(g) Leave of absence or parental leave
(h) Job seeker or in labour market activity
(i) Homemaker
(j) Other
(iv) How long have you lived in Upplands Va¨sby?
(a) 0-4 years
(b) 5-9 years
(c) 10 years or more
(v) How old are you?
(a) 0-14
(b) 15-24
(c) 25-34
(d) 35-44
(e) 45-54
(f) 55-64
(g) 65+
(vi) What is your gender?
(a) Female
(b) Male
(c) Other/agender
(d) Do not want to disclose
Data Availability
The dataset is available on data.world, https://data.world/
samuel-bohman/2015-upplands-vasby-municipality.
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